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IN DEFENSE OF EMPIRE:  GOVERNMENT PRESS 
COLLABORATION IN THE BRITISH WIN THE WAR 
EFFORTS IN NIGERIA DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR
This paper examines the collaboration between the Nigerian 
press and imperial Britain for   the victory of the Allies over Nazi 
Germany during World War II. Guided by the descriptive-analytic, 
historical approach, archival sources and information provided 
by national dailies, which are available at the Nigerian National 
Archives, Ibadan, as well as secondary sources on the subject were 
interrogated to produce the work that is embodied in this essay. 
Against the background of the conventional wisdom that Nigerians 
were so far away from the war theater that they were indifferent to 
appeals for self-sacrifice demanded by the war, the study proposes the 
counter argument that Nigerians made substantial sacrifices which 
contributed to Allied victory over Nazism. The point is illustrated with 
the Nigeria Win the War Fund, which was a scheme designed for the 
purchase of war equipment. It was initiated and sustained by the press, 
but inaugurated with active government support and encouragement, 
contrary to the standard notion of frosty government-press relations 
during the war.
Keywords:  British Colonialism, Colonial Rule, Nazi Germany, Nigerian 
Press, Second World War, Win-The-War Efforts.
Introduction
This paper examines the healthy collaboration between the Nigerian press and 
the colonial regime in encouraging and sustaining enthusiastic contributions of 
colonial Nigerians to the success of Britain’s win-the-war efforts during World 
War II, an episode previously neglected by scholars. As it is well known, on 
3 September 1939, the government of imperial Britain had declared war on 
Germany over the latter’s occupation of Polish territory. This brazen   act of 
German aggression struck a deathblow to the system of collective security in 
Europe. Great Britain, Nigeria’s colonial ruler had quickly reacted by enlisting 
the support of France, a fellow colonial power to wage war against Germany. 
Consequently, the European war had soon spread like a wild, harmattan (dry, 
dust-laden wind) forest fire that gradually engulfed virtually the whole world 
in a holocaust. For British colonies, such as Nigeria, which had huge reserves 
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of men, food and raw materials vital to the success of British war efforts, the 
defense of the colonial master was imperative. For this reason, they became 
potential German military targets, and, were, therefore, psychologically 
conditioned to fight on the side of imperial Britain.
Extant studies of the Second World War  and Africa, which until about 
1984 made “relatively little  use of original research”,1 have  tended to focus 
on its effect in  awakening African political consciousness,2 with a concomitant 
heightening of the tempo of political activities.3 This is often sharply contrasted 
with the pre-war political docility of the  emergent elite,4 vis-a-vis the  hope 
of the colonial overlords during the interwar years to exercise unchallenged 
authority for generations.5 In the case of Nigeria, there is an undue emphasis 
on the dissemination of the new consciousness and ideas of nationalism,6 with 
a consequent backlash from the colonial state.7 In this regard, some scholars 
dwell on the agenda-setting role of the press in league with the emergent elite, 
a role which earned it the strictures of officialdom after the war as agents of 
destabilization, and inciters in vituperative language of sedition against the 
colonial power.8 This official reaction was driven by the erroneous assumption 
that educated Africans who were categorized as semi-literate readers, “lacked 
the critical faculties to distinguish truth from rumor and fair criticism from 
gutter abuse,”9 and were, therefore, easily incited to violence by the written 
word. In effect, Nigerians of the World War II era are portrayed as people who, 
due to their distance from the war theater and the great issues at stake, were 
insensitive to government’s appeal for self-sacrifice and   thus contributed next 
to nothing to the win-the-war efforts of Britain in Nigeria.10 The evidence does 
not, however, support such Eurocentric assertions, or any profound influence 
or success of British wartime and postwar propaganda in conditioning colonial 
Nigerians to fight on the side of their colonizer.11 
The materials for this study consist of Nigeria’s three nationally 
circulated newspapers, which were published in Lagos, the seat of the colonial 
government, as well as archival sources. They were accessed at the University 
of Ibadan Library and the Nigerian National Archives, Ibadan.  The data was 
subjected to the descriptive and critical-analytic historical method, to provide 
a lucid chronological frame work of the episode, and also proffer explanations. 
The three newspapers that were studied for this paper  had served as the nuclei 
around which the contending political tendencies of wartime Nigeria were 
galvanized, in the absence of any serious nationalist political organization 
during the period to mobilize Nigerians for or against the colonial state,  after 
the schism in the Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM).12 The press and pressmen 
thus functioned both as opinion molders and nationalist leaders, mounting the 
podium and the soap box to popularize their view points. The facility with 
which the press accomplished the latter role in spite of the divergent goals 
and strategies espoused by its editor-publishers was not lost on the colonial 
overlords. It is, therefore, germane to provide a brief background of the 
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newspapers’ editors and publishers, including the interests they represented.
The first of the newspapers, West African Pilot was a daily, penny 
newspaper, whose publication had signaled the inauguration of popular 
journalism in Nigeria.  It was the foremost nationalist newspaper in Nigeria 
during the Second World War and indeed, throughout the colonial period. 
Nnamdi Azikiwe, an American-trained Nigeria’s leading journalist and 
nationalist politician of the period, who had cut his journalistic wisdom teeth in 
the Gold Coast as the editor of the Accra African Morning Post started publishing 
it on 22 November 1937.13 In an article in the Vanguard of 13 December 1995, 
Animashaun and Bayagbor noted that Zik, (as he was popularly known) the 
editor of the newspaper, emerged as “the greatest journalist in the country” 
during the World War II years. The West African Pilot had consequently grown 
to be “a fire-eating and aggressive nationalist paper of the highest order.” 14
On the other hand, the Daily Service which had made its debut in 
1938 as the organ of the nationalist Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM) was the 
ideological and inveterate rival of the West African Pilot. Ernest Sisei Ikoli, the 
doyen of Nigerian journalism who was also vice president of the NYM, edited 
the paper from inception in 1938 to 1943. Obviously, Azikiwe, a prominent 
member of the NYM, had resented the competition represented by the Daily 
Service, and consequently opposed Ikoli’s nomination as president of the 
NYM15. This professional-cum-business rivalry plunged the movement into a 
deep schism from which it never fully recovered.16 The rivalry was mirrored 
by the Daily Service, which rabidly antagonized the West African Pilot and 
Azikiwe, whose dramatic rise to prominence was resented by the Yoruba 
elite, especially given Azikiwe’s resignation from the NYM. As from 1943, 
Samuel Ladoke Akintola, a former schoolteacher who was convinced that 
Azikiwe deliberately destroyed the NYM in order to facilitate his own political 
ascendancy, assumed the editorship of the Daily Service, and consequently 
intensified the latter’s anti-Zik editorial stance. 17
The third newspaper was the Nigerian Daily Times, which was 
published in June 1926 by European and Nigerian business men, including 
its foundation editor, Ikoli. Except for H.A.C.M. Bates, an expatriate who 
briefly acted as its General Manager and editor in chief, the paper had 
Nigerian editors. Notable among the latter was Ayodele Lijadu, a former staff 
of the Daily Telegraph (1930-1938) who, in 1938, joined the editorial staff 
of the Nigerian Daily Times, rising to the editorship of the newspaper,1941- 
1946,and  serving as its war correspondent in Burma in 1945, before taking up 
government appointment as Assistant Director of Information  in 1946.18This 
notwithstanding, the Nigerian Daily Times remained committed to an editorial 
policy which placed a premium on its business interest and support for the 
establishment, with attendant credibility problem.
The negative focus on the role of the Nigerian press, and of Nigerian 
contributions to  Allied victory over Nazi Germany relegate and indeed obscure 
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the positive collaboration, at least from the British perspective, between the 
colonial government and the press in Britain’s win-the-war efforts in Nigeria 
. This paper draws attention to the evidence of inter-racial cooperation and 
collaboration for the defeat of Nazism, with the press acting as the driving-
force and great mobilization instruments, at a critical stage of the war when 
the morale of the Allied Forces was abysmally low. This point is important 
because the episode in question occurred at a time when Nigeria lacked a united 
political front to galvanize energies in one direction. The episode chosen to 
illustrate this point is the Nigeria- win- the- war fund, 1940-1945. But though 
long neglected by scholars,  it deserves to be studied in great detail for its effect 
in getting Nigerians to remain materially and emotionally involved in the win- 
the- war efforts of Britain throughout the duration of the war.
Background to the Nigeria –Win- the- War Fund
The emphasis of pre-war British propaganda on Hitler’s Mein Kampf’’s 
equation of Africans with apes and their possible enslavement in the event of 
German victory had spread panic over the thought of such dehumanization. 
Wild rumors which were rife that Nigeria would be ceded to Germany by 
Britain to meet the demands of the former for the return of its territories in 
Africa on the eve of the outbreak of hostilities had thus caused considerable 
anxiety throughout Nigeria. It elicited from Nigerians profuse professions of 
unalloyed loyalty to Britain and their readiness to pay the supreme price in 
defense of the Empire.19As recorded by West Africa on 25 May 1940, Nigeria’s 
colonial Governor Bernard Bourdillon aptly noted that such professions of 
loyalty genuinely reflected Nigerians’ keen appreciation of the implications of 
international events and deep-seated preference for British rule for which they 
were ready to pay the supreme price, in spite of Nigeria’s location in a remote 
corner of the Gulf of Guinea.
The ferocity, unprecedented tenacity and intensity which characterized 
the onslaught of the German military machine on the Allied Forces ensured 
that events moved with amazing rapidity in the European theaters of war. By 
May 1940, the German army had occupied the Low Countries, and knocked 
menacingly at the gates of beleaguered France, which sent out distress calls 
to her ally, Great Britain. The inauguration of a new British war cabinet and 
Great Britain’s consequent deployment of unprecedented number of troops 
and material into France had no effect on the outcome of the famous battle 
of Dunkirk, which ended in victory for Germany and great losses in men and 
material for imperial Britain. As the Nigerian Daily Times editorialized on 
24, 25 June 1940, France was crushed; German troops marched unchallenged 
into Paris on 14 June 1940, and accepted France’s official surrender on 17 
June 1940. The colonial government’s public relations department noted in 
the Nigerian Daily Times of 10 November 1945 that Britain had lost 700 
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tanks, 2,450 guns and 50,000 vehicles of all kinds at Dunkirk. The British 
government was left alone to confront the German menace, and fulminated at 
having been abandoned and let down by an unreliable France, but elected to 
fight on.  Conversely, the French government had expected Britain to suffer 
a quick defeat at the hands of Germany, to wipe away the shame and sorrow 
of France’s occupation.20 Britain’s resolve to fight on, therefore, rested on the 
enormous colonial resources at its disposal.
It was in the wake of France’s capitulation to Germany and barely 
two weeks after the Dunkirk debacle, when the need for weapons was acute, 
that the Nigerian Daily Times, with active government encouragement, 
inaugurated the Nigeria- Win- the- War Fund, on June 15, 1940. The objective 
of the Nigeria- Win- the -War Fund was declared to be the purchase of a tank, 
or an aero plane, for donation to the British army. It is instructive that the 
Nigerian scheme had been preceded by similar schemes in other parts of the 
British Empire, notably the Gold Coast, Nigeria’s neighbor, as well as Malaya, 
Hong Kong, and Jamaica which had   contributed huge sums of money to 
the imperial government to purchase military equipment.  But the Nigerian 
scheme was the first of its kind to be inaugurated by the press in collaboration 
with the government. The press thus maintained the tradition established by its 
First World War predecessors which had supported similar schemes, including 
the National Relief Fund connected with that war. 21
 
Government-Press Collaboration in the Nigeria- Win- the- War Fund
The evidence shows that initial suggestions for some contributions from 
Nigerians to support Britain in stemming the German onslaught had come 
from the Daily Service and West African Pilot, two national dailies articulating 
Nigerians’ yearnings and aspirations during the period.  In fact, colonial 
Nigeria’s chief secretary informed legislators in September 1942 that the 
impetus for the fund’s inauguration for the purchase of some specific war 
instruments had emanated from suggestions from Nigerians.22  For instance, 
the West African Pilot and Daily Service had urged Nigerians to be prepared 
to make more sacrifices in support of the war for universal freedom, in form 
of monetary contributions to sundry war funds, like similar sacrifices made by 
Africans during the First World War in defense of the ‘Mother Countries’. On 
this score, the West African Pilot on 10 April  1940 canvassed a wholehearted 
moral and material support of the imperial power by Nigerians  “Now that the 
war is becoming intensified on the economic as well as on the military front”, 
and “Our Empire is in need”. Similarly, on 8 June 1940, the Daily Service 
had admonished that even though Nigerians were not in any “position to vote 
millions out of the public treasury towards the Imperial Government’s war 
expenditure, which must now be running to several million pounds daily”, 
they could help in many other ways, “if only government would indicate in 
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what way …”
 The unanimous support for monetary and material contributions 
from the press was significant for at least four reasons.  One, the newspapers 
published in Lagos, the seat of the colonial government enjoyed country-wide 
circulation and coverage. The Nigerian Daily Times, West African Pilot, and 
the Daily Service posted average daily circulations of 40,000, 17,000 and 
10,000 copies, respectively during the period, 23 and were, therefore, positioned 
to widely disseminate the idea which they canvassed. Two, different segments 
of the Nigerian population patronized the newspapers, in varying degrees. 
For instance, the Daily Service enjoyed the patronage of NYM supporters, 
including Lagos-based Yoruba elite, rural-based traditional leaders and their 
supporters throughout the Western provinces.24 The Pilot, on the other hand, 
was very popular among the youths of colonial Nigeria, Igbo and non-Igbo 
alike, previously marginalized groups who saw Azikiwe’s success as a symbol 
of their own “achievements and emancipation”.25Even Yoruba elements, who 
were not satisfied with the conservatism and moderation characteristic of the 
leadership provided by the Lagos elite, also gave their support to Azikiwe 
and his newspapers. In fact, there is no doubt that the newspapers reflected 
public opinion and guided government policy.26 Their readers included both 
Christians and Muslims, none of whom constituted any distinct significant 
bloc or pressure group in support of or opposition to the war, or published 
any nationally circulated daily newspaper which articulated or publicized any 
distinct position on the war.27 At any rate the widely circulated publications of 
the American-based Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society, including books 
and tracts read largely by Jehovah’s Witnesses, a sect that was opposed to 
the war and to all earthly governments and kingdoms remained completely 
prohibited from circulation throughout the duration of the war.28Three, the 
press enjoyed the confidence of Nigerian people who looked up to it and 
its practitioners for guidance and information. This was because pressmen 
articulated the yearnings, aspirations and grievances of the readers with an 
“enthusiasm which lacked journalistic dispassion”, and viewed themselves as 
“pilots, guardians, spokesmen, defenders, sentinels, monitors and advocates” 
of the people.29 
This overwhelming rapport of the press with its readership could 
be traced to the immediate pre-war years following the inauguration of 
popular journalism in 1937, by the West African Pilot. The latter gave voice 
to previously voiceless rural dwellers, semi-educated urban workers of 
various shades and affiliations and forever broke the bourgeois leanings of the 
Victorian press which had preceded it. In thus giving publicity to all classes 
of Nigerians, the press of the Azikiwe era aroused a mass audience like never 
before in the history of Nigeria.30 In fact, “for the first time, the reading public 
was not merely a privileged coastal intelligentsia but a relatively wide cross-
section of the population.”31 Thus, the low level of literacy in Nigeria-about 
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17 percent of Southern Nigerians above the age of seven were literate in the 
Roman script by 1952-32 notwithstanding, the press could mobilize the people. 
This was because even illiterate villagers enthusiastically had the contents 
of newspapers read to them by their fairly literate relations33, and especially 
in the hinterland, newspapers were passed from hand to hand. 34 Indeed, the 
population, even though mostly illiterate, longed for “knowledge and reading 
material”35to keep it abreast of developments around it. Four, the lifestyle of 
the population still emphasized a common communitarian ethos, whereby 
family and kinship ties remained  so strong that families and friends could 
gather to have the content of a newspaper read even aloud to the hearing of 
all.36It is common knowledge that one newspaper was circulated among at least 
ten readers, while others disseminated by word of mouth information, which 
they gleaned from the newspapers.37 It was by reading and interpreting news 
to illiterate rural folk, that discussion of affairs of the day was engendered. The 
views of the pressmen, local Nigerians, who could write and speak the white 
man’s language and dispute with the colonial overlord in his own terms were 
applauded and identified with. It is in this sense that the “high prestige attaching 
to education” and the “great authority”, 38 which the written word tended to 
command over the illiterate and semi-literate folk can be understood. Thus 
could also be explained the effectiveness of the press as a great mobilization 
instrument. As Coleman aptly puts it, “Nigerians throughout the country 
were for the first time permitted the stimulation of vicarious participation,”39 
by newspapers which wielded an immense influence by functioning as 
disseminators and purveyors of information and opinions, especially given 
the political milieu in which they operated. Indeed, without television and a 
developed radio service to compete with for audience, the press constituted the 
true mass media of wartime Nigeria, deploying much space and resources to 
mobilize support for and ensure the success of the Nigeria Win the War Fund.
In fact, the newspapers sank their differences to support war efforts. 
They thus provided a leeway for the government to encourage more sacrifices 
towards winning the war. The government, as reported by West Africa on 25 
May 1940, held the view that it was beyond the means of Nigeria to provide 
munitions, and thus capitalized on the goodwill and unanimity of the press, 
which seemed to sink the political differences of its owners and publishers 
in support of war efforts to get the press to inaugurate the war fund scheme. 
Therefore, the Nigerian Daily Times based its announcement of the launch of 
the Nigeria –Win- the- War fund on government’s conviction, as suggested by 
articles and letters in the daily press, about Nigerians’ genuine   anxiety to “give 
further and practical proof of loyalty to the British Empire”. In its editorial 
of 15 June 1940, the newspaper conveyed government’s desire for a “gift of 
money to be devoted to the purchase of some definite instrument of war, for 
example a tank or an aero plane”, through local initiative. By inaugurating 
the fund, whose target it set as a tank, which cost only £20,000, the Nigerian 
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Daily Times helped the government out of a tight corner. The Daily Times 
conferred credibility on the scheme by alluding to the editorial opinions of the 
West African Pilot and the Daily Service as justification for its inauguration. 
However, in commending the win- the- war fund to the “wholehearted and 
generous support of our readers”, the Nigerian Daily Times left no one in doubt 
that it assumed responsibility for the scheme whose inauguration already had 
the blessings of the nationalist press, as well as the colonial government of 
Nigeria.
Implicit in the background to the launch of the win-the- war fund 
was a healthy collaboration for work and war between two ordinarily hostile 
forces. In the wake of losses in men and material incurred by the Allies the 
Nigerian press, especially after Dunkirk, offered concrete suggestions of ways 
in which Nigerians could assist the colonial power in the defeat of Nazism. 
The governor obviously drew strength from such friendly gestures from 
the press, which thereby received official encouragement to implement its 
suggestion. To demonstrate the importance and urgency attached to the fund 
and the expectation that all sections of Nigeria, including Africans, Asians, 
and Europeans should subscribe to it, the Nigerian Daily Times published the 
first list of subscribers and the initial subscription of £477.10. Contributors 
included the governor, the administrative bureaucracy, the private sector and 
individuals (Table 1).
 TABLE 1. List of Initial Contributors to the Nigeria- Win- the- War 
Fund
Identity of  Contributor   
  
Amount Contributed
£  S D
His Excellency 100 0 0
J.N. Zarpas and Co. 251 0 0
Administrative staff of the colony 50 0 0
Irvin and Bonnar 25 0 0
The Hon. A. Alakija and Mrs. Alakija 21 0 0
E.F.A. Tomlinson, Esq. 20 0 0
Dr. & Mrs. Ellis 5 0 0
A. Le Mare, Esq. 5 0 0
B. Papadopulos, Esq. 1 10 0
Total 477 10 0
Source: Nigerian Daily Times, 17 June 1940:1
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The Press and the Sustenance of Popular Enthusiasm for the Scheme
Publication of details of subscriptions achieved the desired effect. It engendered 
confidence in the transparency of the scheme as well as a competitive spirit 
among various classes in the society. Besides, the publication of the target 
sum of £20,000, gave the impression that the task was light, and Nigeria 
could afford it. Indeed, the Win- the -War Fund was generally well received 
by Nigerians, who enthusiastically supported and generously donated to it. 
Such was the enthusiasm that on 30 September 1940, barely three months after 
the inauguration of the fund, the Nigerian Daily Times announced that the 
£25,000 mark had been achieved and set a new target of £50,000, unilaterally. 
It assured subscribers that it had cabled £25,000 to the Secretary of State for 
the Colonies (SOS) for the purchase of aircraft and urged Nigerians to double 
their efforts towards the attainment of the new target. The Nigerian Daily Times 
had obviously gauged popular enthusiasm for the fund, from the increasing 
subscriptions mailed to its General Manager, and determined to exploit the 
Nigerian goodwill in shifting the fund’s initial target. It would not have made 
economic sense to wind up the scheme when the people were still willing 
to donate to it. Nigerians accepted the new target with equanimity. A healthy 
competition developed as each province and/or groups strove with fanfare to 
out-subscribe the others.
Nigerian communities, individuals and groups adopted diverse 
methods to raise money towards the success of the Win  the War Fund. 
Committees were set up to coordinate fund raising efforts and proceeds 
were forwarded in regular installments to the Nigerian Daily Times. Raffle 
draws and dances were also organized to boost contributions to the fund. 
Organized labor and native administrations, including emirates and district 
colonial communities actively contributed to the scheme in a manner that 
engendered and sustained a competitive spirit. Above all, Europeans, either 
as social units or distinct racial groups, identified with the scheme by sending 
their contributions to the Nigerian Daily Times which, by publishing all such 
contributions on the same column as Nigerians’ contributions practically 
demonstrated the unity of the human race in the fight to overthrow Nazism 
(Table 2).
 Table 2. Contributions to the Win- the- War Fund, Aug. 1940
Contributors                                                                 Amount Contributed
£ S D
Abeokuta Committee Win the War 
Fund (2nd Contribution)
1021 3 4
Ilesha NA & People (1st Contribution). 178 9 4
Benue Province Europeans 63 19 6
Benin European Club 50 19 6
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Port-Harcourt Club proceeds of the 
Mrs. W. Mac Donald’s Nightly Raffle
36 4 0
Benue Province Africans 25 7 0
African Staff British West African 18 0 0
Timber Co. Ltd.
Nigerian Union of Teachers 6 5 0
Royal Hotel Dances (4th Contribution). 8 0 0
Alhaji Lagos 1 17 6
Sokoto Emirate 5,216 11 1
Gwandu Emirate 885 7 1
Yauri Emirate 40 0 0
Illo District 33 8 1
Sokoto Province 9610 3 7
Emir, chiefs and Peoples of Zaria 
Province
1674 3 7
Chiefs and People of Bauchi Province 
(Further Contribution)
294 0 0
Buea, Proceeds of dance at Residency 140 1 5
Benue Province (including £100 from 
Anonymous Benue No. 2)
125 0 0
The Club Hitler Club (1st installment) 100 0 0
Total Subscriptions to the Fund 79,936 5 3
Sources: Nigerian Daily Times 31 October 1940:1; 18 September 1941:
1;27 August 1940:5 
Unique contributions from the traditional aristocracy of Northern 
Nigeria, however, deserve some mention. Emirs of the Northern provinces 
made extra contributions to the fund, reflecting the varied sizes of their emirates’ 
resources and salaries of the native authorities. The monthly contributions 
constituted five percent of each Emir’s salary. In the regularity and scale of 
such subscriptions, the Northern emirates were unique in their contributions 
which tended to suggest official inducement. Yet, the centralized structure of 
the Sokoto Caliphate in which authority issued from the Caliph, the religious 
inclination of the people and, above all, the close alliance between the colonial 
overlords and the Northern elite largely accounted for this unique support for 
the fund (Table 3).
TABLE 3. Monthly Contributions to the War Fund by Emirs of the 
Northern Provinces, 1942
Identity of Contributor (Emir) Normal Monthly Contribution
£ S D
Abuja 2 5 0
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Adamawa 8 6 8
Agaie 1 0 0
Bauchi 8 6 8
Bida 8 6 8
Biu 3 0 0
Borno 25 0 0
Bussa 1 0 0
Dubai 1 5 0
Fika 5 5 0
Gombe 5 0 0
Gorgoram 3 5 0
Gumel 10 0 0
Gwandu 5 0 0
Hadeija 2 0 0
Igbira 9 10 0
Ilorin 1 7 6
Jamaare 1 10 0
Kaiama 1 0 0
Kano 35 0 0
Katagum 5 0 0
Katsina 19 3 4
Kazaure 4 3 4
Keffi 1 6 6
Kontagora 3 15 0
Lafiagi 1 13 4
Lapai 1 10 0
Misau 3 0 0
Muri 8 10 0
Nassarawa 1 10 0
Pategi 1 0 0
Shendam 1 10 0
Sokoto 30 0 0
Wamba 12 6 0
Yauri 2 7 6
Zaria 10 0 0
Source: Nigeria Daily Times, 24 April 1942:6.
Contributions from Eastern Nigeria, unlike the North, reflected the 
diffuse political structure of the Eastern provinces and the individualism of the 
people. Women are also mentioned in a distinct contribution, just as groups 
of African workers featured prominently in their regular contributions to the 
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scheme (Tables 4-5).
TABLE 4. Contributions to the Fund, 1940-1942
Contributor Amount Contributed
£ S D
Owerri Province Sundry Collections, Aug/
Sept 1940 2,000 0 0
Women of Ihite, Owerri town, Orlu District 
(Voluntary Collections) Nov. 1940 3 8 10
A lady from the Eastern Provinces: proceeds 
from sales of Artistic productions. 50 0 0
Education staff Buea, (March Contribution) 5 6 10
Mallam Saidi: Buea 0 3 0
Marine African staff, Onitsha (March 
Contribution) 0 6 6
Marine African staff, Onitsha (January 
Contribution) 0 6 6
Marine African staff, Onitsha (February 
Contribution) 0 6 6
G.E. Charles, Provincial Administration 
Degema 0 1 1
Football/Dance Organized By Police Eket 6 4 9
People of Ogoni Tribal Area, Opobo 135 0 0
Staff of Ogwashi-Uku Government School 
(February Contribution) 0 9 9
Staff of Ogwashi-Uku Government School 
(March Contribution) 0 9 9
Prison Staff, Afikpo for March 1942 0 0 3
S.A. Obi Esq. Government School, Afikpo 0 1 0
Staff Education Department Owerri 
Province, Port Harcourt 0 16 4
Staff of the Education Office, Port Harcourt 
(February Contribution) 0 7 6
Staff of Government School, Bonny for 
March 0 16 4
Staff of the Education Office, Port Harcourt 
(March Contribution) 0 5 0
Education office, Eket, March 1942 5 11
E.E. Ekpenyong Esq. Education Department, 
Abak 0 2 6
E.O. Ita, Esq. Education Department, Abak 0 2 6
J.A. Agbuchen, Esq. Education Department, 
Abak 0 2 6
S. Uku Esq. Education Department, Abak 1 6
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O.R.U. Essien Esq. Education Department, 
Abak 0 0 6
H.I. Acholem, Esq. Education Department, 
Abak 0 0 6
P.K. Inyama, Esq. Education Department, 
Abak 0 0 6
I. Ogbonnaya, Esq. Education Department, 
Abak 0 6 6
Total 104,559 9 7
SourceS: Nigerian Daily Times, 17 Oct 1940:6; 12 Dec. 1940:6, 
1 May 1942:3.
TABLE 5. Contribution to the Fund, June 1943.
Contributor                   Amount Contributed
£ S D
Abakaliki Division 2 12 6
Ogoja Division:
Chief Ekpo of Ukelle North 10 0 0
Irruan Clan 1 8 0
Nkim Elders 0 12 0
Osokun Elders 1 15 0
Mbube Priest Chiefs 2 0 0
Nkum Elders 3 0 0
Akaju Elders 0 9 3
Northern Ukelle Elders 7 10 0
Obubra Division:
Egup Ipa Clan 8 17 0
Bahumunu Clan Council 5 0 0
Total Amount Subscribed to date 135,927 16 8
Source: Nigerian Daily Times, 8 June 1943:1
The evidence suggests that despite the absence of a concrete record 
detailing percentage of contributions to the scheme on the bases of nationality, 
ethnicity or race, Nigerians of all classes contributed over 90 percent of 
the fund. For instance, specific mention of European contributions by June 
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1943 when £135, 927 16s 8d had been subscribed amounted to only £52, 10 
shillings and 2 pence, or four percent. Given the enormous privileges enjoyed 
by Europeans in Nigeria at the time and the rising cost of living vis-à-vis 
acute unemployment and war time exertions of Nigerians, the huge sacrifices 
represented by the above figures come into bold relief.
In general, traditional rulers led their subjects by example and thereby 
facilitated mass mobilization in support of the fund.  A notable example was 
provided by the paramount ruler, Awujale of Ijebu Ode, in Nigeria’s colonial 
Western provinces, who had the scheme explained to his subjects through the 
medium of his agent that rang a bell throughout the kingdom in July 1940. 
The message taken round the community was that(i) contribution to the 
scheme was entirely voluntary,(ii)the collection which was effected through 
private individuals did not amount to a levy or tax by government or the 
native administration,(iii)tickets were issued to contributors for convenience 
and accountability and not to track defaulters, and(iv)the paramount ruler, his 
chiefs, and native administration staff had voluntarily subscribed to the fund, 
and expected the wholehearted support of the community for “ the deserving 
cause, which is voluntary help towards the victorious prosecution of the war 
by the Forces of the British Empire”.40 So effective was the mobilization that 
by mid 1943 the new target of £50,000, which was set by the fourth quarter 
of 1940 had been more than twice exceeded. Indeed, every step was taken to 
sustain popular enthusiasm for the fund. 
It would appear that Nigerians were deceived at the inception of the 
fund to believe that only one aero plane or a tank which cost £20,000 was 
the target of the scheme. However, indications that the fund had targeted the 
purchase of many tanks and aero planes, instead of one tank or an aero plane 
as announced by the Nigerian Daily Times had emerged a few days after the 
inauguration of the scheme. The British resident in Oyo province, A.R.A. 
Dickins had informed the Ibadan Native Administration Council meeting 
that the fund was established to finance the purchase of “tanks, aero planes 
and ammunition for the British Empire.”41 Besides, the information officer at 
the Nigerian Secretariat, D.C. Fletcher had drawn the attention of residents 
to the fact that even though the Nigerian Daily Times inaugurated the fund, 
it was the governor’s desire that it be promptly and generously supported.42 
The information officer had further directed that the scheme be given the 
widest publicity possible. Consequently, residents across Nigeria alerted all 
their subordinate officers, notably district officers to comply with the directive. 
These, in turn, attended native administration council meetings, where they 
interacted with chiefs and elders of communities who, in turn, emphasized the 
importance of the fund to their communities.
The evidence, as the Ijebu Ode experience illustrates, does not suggest 
that Nigerians were thereby compelled to donate to the scheme. Instead, the 
press and government, to stimulate a healthy competition in the people for 
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donation to the fund, and to get Nigerians committed to its success, devised 
ingenious ways, which made Nigerians to view and accept the fund as theirs. 
They, therefore, constantly inundated the Nigerian Secretariat with suggestions 
for its sustenance and success, suggestions which received adequate publicity 
in the press, especially the Nigerian Daily Times.
One such ingenious suggestion came from a certain M.C.M. Bridges 
of Calabar. Her scheme, which was designed for propaganda purposes, 
was forwarded to the Acting Chief Secretary to the colonial government of 
Nigeria, who copied all residents in Nigeria for implementation. The core of 
the suggestion, whose implementation would amount to an additional poll tax 
on Nigerians, was that if the scheme was to achieve a resounding success, a 
principal source to be tapped remained the Nigerian masses, from who could 
be realized over £200,000, “If every man, woman and child of Nigeria’s 
twenty million inhabitants gave two pence half penny”.  The money could 
conveniently fund the purchase of “more than a full squadron of the latest 
fighter aero planes, or half a squadron of the latest bomber aero planes…” to 
be deployed in battle against Nazi Germany, “bearing the name of Nigeria as 
Nigeria’s contribution to the war effort of a United Empire”. Bridges hinged 
her suggestion on similar fund raising activities in other less populated British 
colonies, notably the Federated Malay States and the Straits Settlements, with 
vast rubber and tin resources which contributed over one million pounds, 
as well as Nyasaland, Kenya, British Guiana and Trinidad which donated 
thousands of pounds “ to help Britain in her fight for world freedom.”43 
Of equal importance was the collecting and cracking of palm kernels 
competition among school children in Nigeria, a peculiar fund raising activity 
which had been initiated at a time when the low price paid for palm kernels 
had led to the abandonment of the economic activity by the women folk. 
Among schools in Ishan, 44 in Nigeria’s colonial Benin province, a monthly 
prize was awarded to the school which cracked the most kernels per pupil, 
thereby generating and donating over £100 to the fund , unlike their  Warri 
province45 counterparts who instituted a so-called Scholar’s Council that 
imposed fines of additional cups of kernel on pupils for breaches of discipline. 
But, it was among the Okeigbo School children in Nigeria’s Western provinces 
that the kernel-cracking activity was so meticulously organized that records 
were kept. For instance, among the pupils of St. Luke’s School, Okeigbo, in 
March 1943, every pupil  submitted at least one cigarette tin full of kernel 
weekly to the class captain  who, every Friday submitted the quantity collected 
by the whole class for the week to the senior boy of the school. The collection 
was centrally weighed under the supervision of a teacher, and recorded on a 
chart. Prizes were subsequently awarded for the best collections; the higher 
classes tended on balance to collect more kernels, perhaps due to their age and 
maturity (Table 6).
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TABLE 6. Kernel Collections in St Luke Primary School, Okeigbo 
May 1943
Class No of Pupils Amount Collected Average Collected
Std. VI 14 761bs 55lbs
Std. V 29 981bs 331bs
Std. IV 17 891bs 5251bs
Std. III 33 341bs l03lbs
Std. II 36 741bs 205lbs
Std. I 35 791bs 2251bs
Source: Nigerian Daily Times, 16 June 1943: 1
Nigerians’ Support for the Win -the -War Fund: Voluntary or Compulsory?
What is intriguing is why colonial Nigerians would willingly, as it were, 
sacrifice so much towards the success of the Nigeria -Win- the -War Fund. 
The answer is not far to seek. To be sure, the evidence does not suggest that 
Nigerians were overtly compelled to contribute in their diverse ways to the 
success of the fund. In the circumstances of colonial rule with Nigeria as 
a subject territory, the contributions could well qualify as ‘tributes’, which 
Britain extracted “from Nigeria during the war.”46 This view accords with 
the thrust of German propaganda which portrayed Africans as being harshly 
treated and compelled against their will to contribute to Britain’s win the war 
efforts, generally. Crowder, however, dismisses the suggestion as out of tune 
with the enthusiasm with which ordinary Nigerians and their traditional rulers 
contributed to the scheme, in Northern Nigeria, for example.47 
Similar enthusiasm had characterized contributions to the scheme in 
the Western provinces, even though colonial officials tended to show more than 
a passing interest in local activities geared towards getting more money for the 
fund. For instance, Governor Bourdillon through the medium of the Daily 
Times of 1August 1941 had enthusiastically endorsed for implementation the 
suggestion made in a letter to the Daily Times of 31 July 1941, by E. F. A. 
Tomlison, a colonial official, about a fundraising activity, “Club Hitler” Club, 
to fund the purchase of a Nigerian Squadron valued at £100,000. The governor 
had, probably with this suggestion in mind, officially expressed the hope that 
the Nigeria-Win-the-War Fund would achieve the £100,000 mark to facilitate 
the purchase of a squadron and fighters by Nigeria in support of the war effort. 
It is instructive that the Sokoto province consequently contributed £9,000 to 
augment the £7,000 it had contributed in the preceding year. The resident, 
Oyo province had held up these contributions for emulation by the people 
of Oyo who were noted for important chiefs and populous towns.  But the 
people had exercised their discretion about the most convenient time to raise 
funds, not earlier than 1942 when they would have been paid for their cocoa 
produce. In fact, colonial officials on the spot exercised caution in pushing for 
fund raising so as not to give the local people the impression that they were 
being made to pay additional tax, and thereby provide an occasion for violent 
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resistance.48 Thus, although the governor had earlier directed in October 1940, 
that facilities be provided for government employees to subscribe to the fund 
through monthly deductions from their salaries, yet, there is strong  evidence 
that such deductions were at the workers’ instance. Such was the case of Ijebu 
Remo Native Administration Staff Union which resolved to establish a thrift 
society into which every member would pay five per cent of his monthly salary 
throughout the duration of the war, to be placed at the disposal of the colonial 
government, at no interest, for the prosecution of the war.49 
Such apparent voluntary contributions from different classes and 
groups in Nigeria to mushrooming societies, canteen schemes and war 
funds which raked in thousands of pounds duly remitted from Nigeria to the 
metropolitan organizations in charge of them, 50 were a bewildering feature of 
Nigerian sacrifices for Allied victory as early as 1940. In fact, the war funds 
were so numerous that the colonial state tended to be rather open minded in 
its receptivity to their activities. Colonial Nigerians liberally responded to the 
situation which they viewed as a manifestation of the dire straits in which the 
British had found themselves in the aftermath of the German blitzkrieg.  Thus 
amidst contributions to the win-the-war fund, the  Oni, paramount ruler of 
Ife, Western provinces, donated £500  through the colonial district officer, for 
the purchase of a mobile canteen to provide succor for victims of the German 
blitzkrieg in London. The money had been collected in shillings from 10,000 
of his subjects. Such contributions continued throughout Oyo province, and by 
the end of 1944, had amounted to £37,733 (Table 7).
TABLE 7. Total Collections for Oyo Province for various War Funds at 
the end of December 1944
S/NO Name of War Fund Amount Collected
1 War Relief Fund £15,580
2 Win the War Fund £16, 877
3 Greek Relief Fund £737
4 Crown Princess of Greece Relief Fund £637
5 Women Voluntary Service £2,523
6 Prisoners of War Fund £272
7 Troops Comfort £190
8 Red Cross £167
9 Mobile Canteen (Oshogbo) £750
10 Grand Total £37,733
Source: NAI Oyo Prof. 1 File No. 2920
Beneficiaries of contributions such as this were not limited to imperial 
Britain, but extended to other European war-afflicted areas (Table 8).
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TABLE 8. Beneficiaries of Nigerian Contributions to Various War Relief 
Organizations, 1943
S/NO Distribution Amount
£ $ d
1 People of Bombed Britain through Lord Mayor of 
London’s Air Raid Relief Fund
7,168
2 Royal Red Cross 15,500
3 King Georges Fund for Sailors 13,000
4 Shipwrecked Mariners Society 9,500
5 Royal Air Force Benevolent Fund 6,800
6 St Dunstan’s (for men rendered blind in the war) 6,000
7 Various Charities in aid of the People of Malta 9,660
8 Red Cross Aid to Russia Fund 6,000
To the Starving Peoples of the Occupied Countries:
9 Polish Relief Fund 4,700
10 Greek War Relief Fund 2,000
11 Crown Princess of Greece Fund 500
12 Jugoslavia Relief Fund 1,500
13 Lady Cripps Relief for China Fund 1,500
14 Nigerian Disabled Soldiers’ Fund 1,500
15 Nairobi Red Cross Account for Nigerian Troops 550
16 Committee for Welfare of Colonial People in the 
UK
200
17 Wharf Inn, Apapa 1,500
18 Africa Soldiers Canteen 650
19 Services Inn, Lagos 550
20 Seamen’s Institute, Sapele 285
21 Anchor Inn, Port Harcourt 200
22 Ships Inn, Calabar 200
23 Tugwell House, Lagos 600
TOTAL                                                                                             
                   
85,363   
Source: Nigerian Daily Times, 23 October 1943:1.
 For instance, France benefitted from medical comforts, stores and 
supplies, including ambulances and convalescent homes for nurses and officers 
worth £30,000-£40,000, while Finland and Norway similarly benefitted to the 
tune of £12,000.  The Secretary of State for Colonies had, in fact, underscored 
the importance of such donations to war charities when he telegrammed 
British West African governors on the need to mobilize their colonial subjects 
to contribute money for the purchase of small mobile canteens which would 
serve hot foods and drinks to those who had been bombed out of their homes 
and were faced with the grim specter of spending long nights in the wintery 
cold.51 In their response, Nigerians also made donations in kind towards 
providing food for the military (table 9)
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TABLE 9. Contributions of Yams towards Feeding the Military by 
Community Leaders
S/NO Contributors Gifts of Yam
1 The Aleruwa of Eruwa 400 tubers of yams
2 The Bale of Ogbomosho 1000 tubers of yams
3 The Olosi of Osi 1000 tubers of yams
4 The Alawe of Ilawe 2600 tubers of yams
5 The Alara of Ara 1800 tubers  of yams
6 The Alade Community of Idanre Ondo 
Province
600 tubers of yams
7 The Oleja of Okemessi 800 tubers of yams
8 The Olukere of Ikere 31 tubers of yams
Source: Nigerian Daily Times, 8 June 1943:1
It is, therefore, more rewarding to view Nigerian contributions as 
voluntary, even if the fear of the unknown partly sustained such contributions. 
In this connection, the voluntary contributions could be ascribed to five 
main reasons. First, Nigerians were apprehensive of any possibility of 
colonial domination by Nazi Germany, given its ideology of racism. In the 
circumstance, they chose their colonial master, who had forcibly imposed his 
rule on them but with whom they were familiar, Britain, instead of Germany, 
a prospective colonial master whose utterances foreshadowed doom for them 
in the event of Britain’s defeat. Their ready response to calls for substantial 
contributions, including subscribing generously to numerous war funds was 
their demonstration of a preference for British rule.52 Second, and a corollary 
of this explanation, is that Nigerians believed the opinions expressed in the 
local press that they should support the win-the-war scheme to speed up the 
defeat of Nazism. The colonial government seemed to capitalize and key 
into Nigerians’ loathe of German rule to urge a whole-hearted support for 
the scheme. By contributing to the purchase of war equipment, therefore, 
Nigerians no doubt believed they were contributing their own quota towards 
the speedy defeat of Hitler and Nazism. The evidence shows that British 
wartime propaganda was a total failure and had no effect, whatsoever53. It can 
thus be categorically stated that the Nigerian press was largely responsible 
for Nigerians’ embrace and unstinted support for the success of the scheme. 
The Nigerian press had portrayed Germany as the aggressor, which the whole 
world hated, and Britain as fighting Hitler with the backing of all humanity. 
German aggression and lawlessness on the eve of World War II certainly 
disintegrated the system of collective security and tended to justify might as 
right, even though totalitarian states, like Italy and Japan actively deployed 
similar tactics, thereby casting Britain in the mold of defender of endangered 
humanity. In fact, frontline nationalists who were also the leading journalists 
of the period, notably Herbert Macaulay, and Nnamdi Azikiwe lent credence 
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to this position.
For instance, Azikiwe, Nigeria’s most charismatic nationalist 
journalist and politician of the World War II era toured towns in the Western 
and Eastern provinces   during which he organized football matches, among 
other activities, to raise fund for war charities. The Daily Service and its 
publishers the Nigeria Youth Movement also encouraged subscriptions to the 
fund in diverse ways. On his part, Herbert Macaulay, the doyen of Nigerian 
nationalism broadcast to Nigerians, urging their support for the war effort. In 
one of such broadcasts, he assured that “Victory for Democracy and Freedom 
for mankind depend on our contributions, and our determination and our 
loyalty”, and enjoined Nigerians to “rally round the Union Jack”.54
The third reason contributors to the fund sacrificed so much to ensure 
victory for the United Nations, as the Allies came to be known as from 1942, 
was their conviction that they were contributing to a worthy and noble cause. 
It was their expectation that at the end of the hostilities, when the roll of 
honor was called their names would not be left out. This was the major reason 
traditional rulers throughout Nigeria encouraged their subjects to support 
the scheme by all means. The Oba of Benin emphasized this point when he 
admonished the chiefs and people of Benin City in 1942:
I make this appeal not because the United Nations cannot win the war 
even if the Benins fail to contribute their quotas to the sum total of the 
Empire’s war effort…But I do make the appeal so that when the day 
comes, the great day of victory won by the United Nations the worthy 
name of Benin may be mentioned… and… Benins may be able to say 
with pride ‘and we, too, have helped to win the war’.55
The personality of Governor Bourdillon was the fourth reason for 
Nigerians’ contributions to the Win- the- War Fund. He had engendered in them 
a commitment to give generously. The humility, and personal touch with which 
he related with Nigerians, particularly the educated elite, 56 and the publicity 
he accorded his gratitude for their sacrifice toward the war effort endeared him 
to them. The governor made regular broadcasts over the Lagos radio diffusion 
to acknowledge donations and praise the popular enthusiasm for the success 
of the fund. In such broadcasts, the governor disclosed the amount realized 
and how it was expended. In addition, he singled out spectacular donations 
and fundraising efforts for mention, without failing to commend the widow’s 
mite. By so doing, he also publicized fundraising activities in various parts 
of Nigeria for emulation or adoption by sundry groups. His broadcast of 23 
January 1941 was typical:
Children of the Government School at Abak wrote in sending in “these 
few pennies from us to the British Government to buy a bomber with 
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which to bomb and defeat Hitler and his wicked agents”. Similarly, 
various group councils in the Nnewi area in Onitsha contributed the 
sum of £10 each to the win-the-war fund, asking that these amounts 
should be deducted from their executive salaries. Also, the Nsukka 
Division of the Onitsha Province raised over £400 for the win-the-
war fund. In Ganuwari, in the Plateau Province, the elders of Biron 
tribe “collected our pennies” and raised nine pounds ten shillings. 
The win-the-war fund has caught the popular fancy. 57
 Such acknowledgements and commendations from the highest 
authority in the land must have boosted the morale of Nigerians, and conferred 
credibility, accountability and transparency on the scheme. In fact, lack of 
such acknowledgements or delays in the publications of subscriptions by 
communities in the press led to considerable anxiety among the affected 
groups. It also led to suggestions for investigations into the possibility of 
“other sums due to the fund which have not been credited to it in respect of 
other provinces”.58 Given the ‘Spitfire’ aircraft named after their towns and 
provinces in recognition of their generous donations, the fund, as the Pilot 
suggested on 24 April 1941, came to be likened to the well-known self- help 
scheme among Africans. Finally, Nigerians expected some reward after the 
war by way of a gradual transfer of power, which would culminate in self-
government. In anticipation of this, Azikiwe outlined a phased transfer of 
power to Nigerians between 1943 and 1958. His blueprint had been serialized 
in the West African Pilot for the colonial authorities to read, and inwardly digest 
Nigerian aspirations towards political freedom.59 Indeed, as Nwabughuogu 
rightly observes, “from all indications African responses seemed to have been 
determined more by their desire to improve themselves than to please Britain 
during the war.”60
To be sure, the contributions of ordinary Nigerians to the win-the-
war effort were significant. In spite of their distance from the theater of war, 
they appreciated the enormous sacrifices called forth by war, and readily 
responded to government’s call for increased production of export and other 
commodities needed for the successful prosecution of the war. As the colonial 
government of Nigeria acknowledged, in many other directions, Nigerians 
made substantial contributions to the war effort, “accepting without demur 
low prices for their goods, cheerfully accommodating themselves to transport 
restrictions and to shortage and high cost of imported goods, providing 
recruits for the services and subscribing generously to numerous war funds”.61 
Indeed, the healthy government-press collaboration while the war lasted in the 
conception and execution of the Nigeria- Win- the -War Fund was remarkable. 
So much did they cooperate that the fund received more than its fair share 
of publicity of all war funds and war efforts. The weight of responsibility in 
this regard became too heavy for the General Manager of the Nigerian Daily 
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Times to bear, having undertaken at the inception of the fund to handle all 
subscription to it. The government decisively intervened and ensured that the 
work of coordination, including receipt of all subscriptions to the fund was 
taken over by the Nigerian Secretariat. Such healthy collaboration ensured 
that the fund became the success story that it was. By the time it was closed in 
October 1945, over £150,000 had been realized.
As noted elsewhere, close to £140,000 of this amount had been 
realized by June 1943. In effect, the force that galvanized people for action in 
favor of the fund became slack by 1944.  Governor Arthur Frederick Richards 
had replaced the retired, ailing Governor Bourdillon in December 1943. He 
had come from Jamaica, where the record of his relations with the educated 
elite was abysmal, determined to stem the tide of Nigerian nationalism. The 
old-style colonial autocracy which he represented obviously hurt popular 
enthusiasm for the fund. The governor had shown scant regard for Nigerian 
nationalist aspirations by imposing an unpopular constitution on the country, 
even as he triggered a general strike by Nigerian workers over his refusal to 
grant wage increases to cushion them from the effects of war-induced hardship 
and high cost of living index. 62
Nonetheless, the Win the War Fund achieved the objectives for which 
it was inaugurated. In August 1943, a Mosquito Bomber, named Nigeria was 
purchased for £20,000. Besides, the Nigerian squadron consisting of aircraft 
bought from the fund was emplaced by April 1942. The 25 planes in the fleet, 
each bearing the name of each of Nigeria’s 23 provinces, as well as Lagos and 
Colony were actively engaged in the war, and by April 1942 were reported to 
have destroyed nearly 50 enemy aircraft. Also, in January 1945, 13 Bren gun 
carriers were bought from the fund and handed over to the British Ministry 
of Supply on behalf of Nigeria by His Grace, the Duke of Devonshire, at a 
ceremony, which the Nigerian Daily Times reported on 10 November 1945 
was attended by Bernard Bourdillon. The newspaper had perceptively 
attributed the Nigerian feat to the fact that “the poor gave of their little and 
others contributed generously”. As West Africa reported on 29 December 
1945, Britain appreciated Nigeria’s sacrifices and gifts with a mere gold 
disc, which the Nigerian Daily Times observed on  17September 1947 was 
supplemented by a plaque from the Ministry of Aircraft Production in 1947. 
Nigerians justifiably felt shortchanged. As the Daily Service editorialized on 7 
June 1946, Nigerians complained that:
… the oppressed people of the British Empire sallied forth to fight for 
Britain because they hoped Britain would on the morrow of victory 
establish for them a claim to the human rights against Nazism …
The Nazi brand of oppression and persecution, of bad faith and brute 
force has been completely obliterated but the British brand, equally 
vile and obnoxious still lingers and we are victims of it… A nation, 
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which fought and staked so much for liberty and freedom still has 
India in fetters and holds millions of so-called backward peoples in a 
political and economic bondage. What are we to rejoice over? Victory 
over what? This is the time for sober reflection.
Conclusion
Barely nine months after the outbreak of World War II, Germany inflicted heavy 
losses in men and material on the Allied forces at the famous battle of Dunkirk, 
and proceeded by mid-June 1940 to overrun France, which capitulated, to 
the consternation and despondency of imperial Britain. It was at this point 
in the war when the morale of the Allies was at its nadir that the Nigerian 
press, with the active encouragement of the colonial government, inaugurated 
the Nigeria- win-the-war fund for the purchase of war equipment for the 
defense of the ‘mother country’. The ready response of Nigerians to calls for 
substantial contributions, including subscribing generously to numerous war 
funds was their demonstration of a preference for British rule, and faith in the 
opinions expressed in the local press that such support would speed up the 
defeat of Nazism. By contributing to the purchase of war equipment, therefore, 
Nigerians no doubt believed they were contributing their own quota towards 
the attainment of the British declared objective of world freedom, which 
Nigerians had extended to include freedom from colonial rule.  The Nigerian 
press had portrayed Germany as the aggressor, which the whole world hated, 
and Britain as fighting Hitler with the backing of all humanity. It was through 
the efforts and admonitions of the press, including nationalist-journalists like 
Macaulay, Azikiwe and Ikoli that popular enthusiasm for the success of the 
fund was achieved so much so that the Nigeria -win-the-war fund achieved 
the singular distinction of being the most popular of the numerous war funds 
in wartime Nigeria. Indeed, despite their distance from the theater of war, 
Nigerians appreciated the enormous sacrifices called forth by war, and readily 
responded to government’s call for increased production of export and other 
commodities, and made diverse other substantial contributions, including 
providing recruits for the services and subscribing generously to numerous 
war funds needed for the successful prosecution of the war.  In fact, the healthy 
government-press collaboration while the war lasted in the conception and 
execution of the Nigeria- Win- the- War Fund was remarkable.
In effect, the Second World War era press in Nigeria had much more 
than a nuisance value to the colonial regime. It was also constructive and indeed, 
collaborative in the war against Nazism. Also, contrary to the conventional 
wisdom on the subject, the distance of Nigerians from the theaters of war did 
not make them indifferent to the war, insensitive to government’s appeal for 
self-sacrifice nor cushion them from the effects of the world conflagration. 
The press brought home to Nigerians the news and grim implications of the 
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war, and mobilized them to fully support all measures geared towards victory 
for the Allies. In their support of British war aims, wartime measures and 
war funds as a result of which they sacrificed so much, they expected some 
rewards in form of wide ranging reforms and ultimate self government after 
the war. They faithfully paid their dues, politically, economically and socially, 
but regretted at the end of the war, while Europeans celebrated victory over 
Nazism, that colonialism had taken them for a ride.
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